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D-R-A-F-T

8 August 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVANTAGES OF INSPECTION AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK

1. An inspection system designed to give warning against surprise attack would have a great net intelligence advantage to the US, even though such a system by itself, or in conjunction with intelligence, could not guarantee to give warning of such attack.

2. Inasmuch as a planned surprise attack, if detected in advance, could be disastrous for the attacker, the Soviet Union would have to weigh with the greatest care its ability to mount an attack without detection by Western intelligence. The risk of detection with consequent premature triggering of retaliation, therefore, is one of the greatest safeguards that we have at the present time against surprise attack by the USSR. The greater the amount of information available to Western intelligence, the greater would be the risk run by the Soviets should they undertake a surprise attack. The information obtained from an inspection system, added to that already available to Western intelligence, would cause a great increase in the risk factor. In addition, it would increase our knowledge of the Soviet military capability to mount such an attack, even if we were not to detect their intention, and a recognition of the Soviet capability would improve our ability to prepare in advance for the eventuality.

3. Any increase in our knowledge of the USSR would improve our ability to assess Soviet actions and intentions in a wide range of activities beyond that of surprise attack alone. Such improved assessment should help us do a more efficient job in the entire field of US-Soviet relations.

4. The US is an open society, and we have good reason to believe that a Soviet apparatus still exists in this country. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is a closed society in which strong security measures have been in force for many years. We know less about the Soviet Union than they know about us, and we are forced to expend greater resources than they in acquiring this lesser amount of information. Mutual inspection could not help but fill more gaps in our knowledge about the Soviet Union than it would fill in the knowledge of the USSR.

5. An inspection system involving aerial inspection, fixed ground posts and mobile inspection parties in the Soviet Union, all with secure communications, would provide the following opportunities for the collection of intelligence:

a. Aerial Photography

This is a source of great value to intelligence. Complete aerial coverage of the Soviet Union would provide clues as to Soviet intentions and would be a key factor in assessing Soviet capabilities.

b. Direct Observation by Trained Observers

This would give clues concerning Soviet intentions and permit a considerable increase in our knowledge of scientific, technical, and industrial aspects of Soviet strength. It would also give us an improved opportunity to assess political and psychological factors through contact with individual Russians.

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6. An inspection system would greatly improve the effectiveness of Western intelligence in other respects:

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b. The presence of inspection teams, with their own secure communications, deep inside the Soviet Union would make it possible to forward information for analysis in less time than it takes at present.


c. The increased data available as a result of the inspection system would improve the accuracy of analysis even in those subjects concerning which we already have a fair amount of intelligence.

7. The intelligence advantages described above could be maximized under a bilateral inspection scheme in which the US inspected the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union inspected the US. Only the US would judge the effectiveness of the inspection. The judgment would be based on the information supplied by the inspection force and Intelligence. This judgment, based on the combined data, would be more accurate than the judgment based on either set of data by itself. Such an inspection system, however, might not create adequate confidence in the minds of allies and important neutrals and would be subject to acts of provocation undertaken by the Soviet Union to discredit our inspection force.


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8. A modified bilateral inspection scheme, in which the US and its allies inspected the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union and its allies inspected the US would be almost as useful as the pure, bilateral scheme,



9. A multilateral inspection scheme operating under UN direction (as opposed to UN sponsorship which might apply to all schemes), for example, would be far less favorable than either of the foregoing types of organization. Neutrals might have more confidence in the system, but it would be impossible to brief the organization adequately concerning targets. Secure communications could not be arranged, and the entire system would operate less effectively and at a slower pace than in either of the methods described above.



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